Overconfident people should be surprised that they are so often wrong. Are they? Three studies examined the relationship between confidence and surprise in order to shed light on the psychology of overprecision in judgment. Participants reported ex-ante confidence in their beliefs, and after receiving accuracy feedback, they then reported ex-post surprise.
Overprecision and Surprise 3 Ross, 2011). Overprecision leads people to do too little to protect themselves against lowprobability risks (Mannes & Moore, 2013) . And overprecision blinds people to the need to consider other perspectives (Liberman, Minson, Bryan, & Ross, 2012; Ortoleva & Snowberg, 2015) . These mistakes can have painful consequences for both individuals and organizations (Mergenthaler, Rajgopal, & Srinivasan, 2012) . Given the costly consequences of overprecision, understanding its persistence is important.
We compare different measures of overprecision. Researchers have most often used the confidence interval paradigm employed by Alpert and Raiffa (1982) . This method consistently finds overprecision (Bazerman & Moore, 2013) , though it is controversial. The two most common critiques consider confidence intervals to be too difficult for participants to understand (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996) , and that individuals do not naturally think about confidence in terms of confidence intervals (Mannes & Moore, 2013) . We directly compare the confidence interval method with more naturalistic measures of confidence.
Surprise
Surprise is one of the basic emotions (Levenson, 2011) . Its fundamentally functional role is to highlight erroneous predictions and to direct attention at the surprising stimulus (Itti & Baldi, 2006) . This function is sufficiently universal that surprise has proven useful in studying beliefs and expectations among monkeys and human infants (Steckenfinger & Ghazanfar, 2009; Xu & Spelke, 2000) . When something unexpected happens, it receives more attention and longer gaze. The level of surprise one experiences and the duration of subsequent gaze is positively correlated with the degree of difficulty making sense of an event (Maguire, Maguire, & Keane, 2011) . Seeing someone levitate is more surprising than Overprecision and Surprise 4 seeing them jump. The more unexpected an event, the more intense the reaction to it (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997) .
The more confident one is of one's beliefs, the more surprising it should be when those beliefs turn out to be wrong. Given the ubiquity of overprecision in judgment, people should be surprised regularly. Here, we seek to connect the literature on surprise with the literature on overprecision in judgment. Research has not yet, to our knowledge, tested the hypothesis that predictions made with greater confidence will produce greater surprise when they turn out to be wrong. We test this prediction, and examine its consequences for the correction of subsequent confidence in judgment.
Present Research
We asked participants to report ex-ante confidence for a variety of judgments, and after receiving performance feedback they then reported ex-post surprise at the result. This research hones in on a key interaction, wherein the relationship between ex-ante confidence and ex-post surprise is moderated by whether one's answer is correct. We present three studies examining this relationship. Study 1 examines the relationships between confidence, correctness, and surprise for both self and others. Study 2 exogenously manipulates confidence and replicates the key finding from the first study. Study 2 uses a different manipulation of confidence and employs a repeated-measures design to explore the effect of confidence on surprise. Finally, in Study 3, we consider lay predictions regarding how surprised people believe they or others should be. Across the three studies, we employ a variety of different measures of belief precision and subsequent surprise, thereby testing their relationships with each other.
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We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all conditions, and all measures. Pre-registrations (for Studies 2 and 3), materials, and data are available: http://osf.io/j5vpe/.
Study 1: Accuracy and Surprise
Study 1 examined the basic relationship between surprise and overconfidence. We hypothesized that both confidence and correctness would positively predict surprise. We also computed a measure of absolute distance from the true answer as an additional predictor on surprise. We expected higher ex-ante confidence would produce lower ex-post surprise for correct judgments, and for incorrect judgments higher ex-ante confidence would produce greater ex-post surprise. Study 1 seeks the antecedents of surprise, by examining the effect of confidence, correctness, and distance from the truth on subsequent surprise.
Method
We exposed 430 MTurk workers to a set of five photographs of strangers.
Participants had to guess how much each person weighed and report their confidence (on a scale from 0 -100%) that their answer was within ten pounds of the true weight. After the five images, participants saw the true weight of each person in turn, followed by truthful feedback on whether or not their estimate fell within ten pounds of the actual weight.
Following each round of feedback, participants reported their surprise on a scale of 0-100.
Results and Discussion
Results reveal participants to be overprecise: The average hit rate for estimates within ten pounds of the true weight was 37%, yet average confidence was 66% (SD = 20.48). Given the repeated measures design, we employed a multilevel regression model Overprecision and Surprise 6 with random slopes. We measured distance as the absolute value of the difference between the participants' estimates and the true weight of the person in the photograph.
We conducted a multilevel regression predicting surprise from absolute distance, correctness, confidence, and the interaction between correctness and confidence, all nested at the individual level. The results reveal that absolute distance did indeed positively predict participants' reported surprise, β = .33, t(451) = 14.84, p < .001. There were also significant main effects of confidence on surprise, wherein greater ex-ante confidence predicted greater ex-post surprise, β = .11, t(451) = 2.98, p = .003, and for correctness on surprise, β = .21, t(451) = 2.89, p = .003, where being correct predicted greater surprise.
Additionally, there was a significant confidence-correctness interaction effect on surprise, β = -.21, t(451) = -2.82, p < .005.
We next compared correct and incorrect answers by analyzing them with separate multilevel regressions. When participants were incorrect, more confidence produced more surprise, β = .23, t(439) = 3.34, p < .001, and greater absolute distance from the truth also produced greater surprise, β = .52, t(439) = 10.47, p < .001. When participants were correct, confidence no longer predicted greater surprise, β = -.13, t(380) = -1.35, p = .17. However, the greater the distance between guesses and the truth, the more surprise they as another confidence measure.
In addition, participants reported confidence on a 1 to 7 scale (from "Not at all confident" to "Extremely confident"). After learning the right answer, participants reported surprise on a 1-7 scale (from "Not at all surprised" to "Extremely surprised").
Hit rates between the 25 th and 75 th percentiles were similar for aleatory (65.83%) and epistemic questions (68.78%), t(114) = -1.51, p = .13. These hit rates suggest that participants were actually underprecise for both bingo ball questions and weight guessing questions, as both hit rates are greater than 50%. However, the bingo rounds produced .12. The positive relationship we found previously between confidence and surprise when incorrect is nearly nonexistent, β = .02, t(119) = 0.59, p = .56.
The relationship between confidence interval size and self-reported confidence is not intuitive for participants. Confidence interval size was correlated with self-reported confidence at r = .28, p < .001. This suggests that as intervals grew (implying lower confidence), self-reported confidence also increased--a contradictory pattern. Puzzlingly, this correlation between CI size and scale confidence only exists with incorrect answers, r = .30, p < .001, the correlation is nonsignificant for correct answers, r = .05, n.s. This is intriguing as both measures of confidence are reported prior to participants learning the correct answer.
This study's repeated-measures design allowed us to test the effect of surprise on confidence over time. We employed a lagged regression to see how confidence is predicted by correctness at t -1 (i.e., how correctness in any given round predicts confidence in the round immediately following). Lagged correctness at t -1 significantly predicted confidence at time t, β = .07, t(115) = 4.12, p < .001. In other words, participants expanded their confidence intervals after having been wrong. Did reported surprise impact subsequent confidence similar to how correctness affected subsequent confidence? Adding lagged surprise at t -1 into the same model showed no significant effect of lagged surprise on confidence, β = .003, t(116) = 0.13, p = .89. This result suggests a profound failure of the functional role of surprise: it did not reduce subsequent confidence. The inclusion of lagged surprise also left the main effect of lagged correctness on surprise nearly unchanged, β = .07, t(116) = 3.78, p < .001.
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Results of Study 2 introduce important caveats to our key interaction between confidence and correctness on reported surprise. The results reinforce the importance of the method one uses to elicit confidence, as our key results largely disappear using the confidence-interval elicitation. This might be attributable to the difficulties people have setting confidence intervals. For instance, people set 50% confidence about as wide as they set 98% confidence intervals, despite the fact that 98% confidence intervals should be much wider (Teigen & Jørgensen, 2005) . These results add to our skepticism of confidenceinterval measures and the degree to which they effectively capture subjective feelings of confidence. However, there is another possibility: Because two effects may have cancelled each other out: (1) more confident people were more surprised at being wrong but (2) people who gave wider intervals (i.e. those less confident) were more surprised that their larger intervals did not contain the right answer. This ambiguity interpreting confidence interval measures led us to abandon confidence interval elicitations in Study 3.
Study 3: Predicting Surprise
Study 3 asks whether people are as surprised as they should be. The study randomly assigned half the participants to a prediction condition which elicited predictions of surprise for hypothetical correct and incorrect answers. The other half of participants, in the control condition, made no such predictions. Study 3 again employed both aleatory and epistemic judgments.
In choosing which tasks to use, we noted that Study 2 found surprise to be lower for bingo balls than weight-guessing. Since the distribution of bingo balls is uniform, all numbers are equally likely and there is little reason to be surprised by any particular Overprecision and Surprise 13 outcome, potentially contributing to diminished "surprisingness." Therefore, Study 3 replaces bingo ball draws with a set of ten coin flips, which has a single-peaked distribution of outcomes and the potential for truly surprising outcomes (such as ten flips all coming up tails). Each survey informed participants that there would be ten rounds of ten coin flips each and ten rounds of guessing individuals' weights from images. For each of the two blocks (which were presented in a random order) participants provided a best guess estimate as well as their confidence in being correct (on a 1-100 scale). Following each round, we truthfully informed participants whether they had answered correctly, and then participants reported their surprise at the outcome (on a 1-7 scale). Answers for coin flips counted as correct if they were within one head (out of ten) of the actual outcome. Weight guesses counted as correct if they were within ten pounds of the truth.
Method
We assigned participants to one of two between-subjects conditions: a control condition and a prediction condition, where, in each round, in addition to the procedure described above, participants predicted how surprised they would be if their answer was right and if it was wrong.
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Results and Discussion
On average, participants were overconfident. They report being 55.5% confident on average, but they are only right 50.3% of the time, one-sample t(2804) = 12.1, p < .001.
This confidence declines with experience. It starts at 60.2% in Round 1 and declines to 52.8% in Round 20. A linear regression predicting confidence with round number, coin/weight, and fixed effects for subject produces a strong effect of round, B = -.59, t = -5.08, p < .001. There is no significant difference in expressed confidence between weight and coin rounds, B = -1.55, t = -1.16, p = .25. This lack of a difference between weight and coin rounds is remarkable given that participants' guesses are correct 61% of the time for coin rounds but only 39.8% of the time for weight rounds, t(3038) = 11.83, p < .001.
Were participants as surprised as they predicted they should be? In order to test this, we employed two independent-samples t-tests to account for the repeated measures design, comparing the predicted surprise for a correct answer to a subsequent correct answer's surprise, and comparing the predicted surprise for an incorrect answer to a subsequent incorrect answer's surprise. Through this we see that participants reported less surprise (M = 3.30, SD = 1.91) than they predicted they would (M = 3.78, SD = 1.82) when correct, t(712) = 7.63, p < .001. Conversely, they were more surprised (M = 4.77, SD = 1.82) than predicted (M = 3.61, SD = 1.74) when incorrect, t(761) = -15.56, p < .001. These patterns are similar for both coin and weight rounds.
We also explored whether the mere act of prediction had an impact on one's subsequent surprise. We employed a repeated measures one-way ANOVA predicting ex- Those who predicted their surprise wound up reporting more surprise (M = 4.04, SD = 2.01) than those who did not (M = 3.39 , SD = 2.04).
In testing a replication of the lagged analysis from Study 2 we ran a similar lagged analysis predicting confidence with correctness at t -1. The analysis shows that when it was the only predictor, lagged correctness positively predicted subsequent confidence, β = .04, t(150) = 2.81, p < .005. However, including lagged surprise wipes out the relationship, leaving only lagged surprise significant, β = -0.09, t(150) = -4.23, p < .001, where more surprise at t-1 led to less confidence at t. This contrasts with the result from in Study 2.
To explore whether this failure to replicate was an artifact of eliciting predictions of surprise in the prediction condition, we subsetted the data by condition and ran the same analyses. In the prediction condition, the relationship stayed significant with less power, β = -.08, t(75) = -2.70, p = .007. The relationship also holds in the control condition, which presents itself as a close replication of Study 2 since participants made no predictions, β = -.10, t(73) = -3.45, p < .001. In short, results from Study 3 do indeed document the corrective effect by which surprise reduces subsequent confidence.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our results show that ex-ante confidence and ex-post surprise are inextricably linked. Our primary finding is that when people are correct, greater ex-ante confidence produces less ex-post surprise, whereas when they are incorrect, greater ex-ante confidence produces more ex-post surprise. We examine the psychology underlying these relationships Overprecision and Surprise 16 and identify moderators that can either suppress or enhance their strength. Studies 1 and 2 establish the link between confidence and surprise, highlighting that correctness is a powerful moderator of the relationship. Studies 2 and 3 employ exogenous manipulations of confidence; their results replicate the correlational results of Study 1. Study 2 finds more powerful confidence-correctness interaction effects on surprise for epistemic questions than for aleatory, consistent with the notion that feeling personally accountable for knowing or not knowing the answer increases the intensity of emotional reactions to being right or wrong. Study 3 finds that people are more surprised about being wrong than they expect to be.
What of the utility of surprise? If surprise reflects prediction error, individuals should seek to maximize accuracy and minimize surprise (Ely, Frankel, & Kamenica, 2015) .
This implies that surprise should lead people to reduce their subsequent confidence. Our results suggest that surprise does not always play this functional role, or that it is difficult to We aspired to measure the effects of overprecision on surprise. In recording participants' ex-ante confidence, their correctness, and their ex-post surprise, we document consistent evidence suggesting that people expect to be correct. If they go into a decision
